War Strategy of the Second Anglo-Boer War
by Dylan Craig

Appraisals of tactics in the Anglo-Boer War must give a certain bias to Boer initiative; if there is an overall theme to the cut-and-thrust of the war it is one of "Boer movement, British response". Initially, at least, this was partly the result of sound tactical thinking on the part of the Boer generals, and partly the result of the precarious British starting position in the war. Britain had massive military and economic resources, which when brought to bear on the two Boer republics could have no result but victory. The only chance for the Boers was to strike quickly, and to cut off the British lines of re-supply from England - namely, the ports. As a strategy, this counted on the fact that when war was declared, Boer forces actually outnumbered British forces by a slight margin. This meant that the British were forced by circumstance into a holding strategy - to meet the Boer invasions of the Cape Colony and Natal, contain them, and if possible turn them back.

In addition, several features of British military theory of the time relied on attacking the enemy formation rather than position, by flanking movements with mounted infantry, cavalry charges against emplacements, and so on; this had worked well in the gigantic set-piece battles of the Crimean and Napoleonic Wars. However, against an entrenched enemy whose positions were invisible (due to the lack of gun smoke), concealed (as in the case of the battle of Magersfontein, where Cronje used concealed trenches to decimate a British advance) or highly mobile, this strategy was completely ineffective. The technological advances in firepower discussed previously meant that it was effectively impossible to break an entrenched line by infantry assault over open ground.

Time and time again, British advances against Boer trenches ground to a halt between 500 and 800m from their objectives due to the highly accurate rifle fire being directed against them. The initial inferiority of British artillery in terms of range meant that counter-battery fire in support of the infantry was impossible without risking the loss of the guns. In contrast, Boer tactics were focused on possession of position; kopjes which provided a good line-of-sight onto attackers were picked in advance (in the case of defensive engagements), or taken as a matter of priority (in the case of offensive engagements). From these vantage points, the Boers could wreak havoc on the British forces below. When their positions became threatened, the highly mobile Boer forces would simply move away, usually to another set of pre-prepared defences. Another Boer tactic involved marking out ranges, using white stones, prior to a British attack; with the aid of these distances, they could adjust their rifle and artillery fire and increase its effectiveness. "Stay clear of officers and white rocks", new British troops were told.

The Boer forces, then, seemed to hold all the aces. They were better equipped, led by men of higher calibre and more proven experience, and better accustomed to veld fighting than their opponents. Additionally, the British were having to lean the rules of modern warfare as they struggled along, instead of starting the war with any coherent idea of what to expect or how to accomplish victory. Many British troops expressed concern that the Boers might not fight at all; thus, once war did begin, they were completely on the wrong foot. The armies that were sent out to check the Boer invasion were soon completely routed and put to disorderly retreat. However, after defeating the British at Modder River (28th November), Stormberg and Magersfontein (11th December) and Colenso (December 16th), the Boer advance ground to a halt outside the towns of Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking. A case in point was the battle of Nicholson's Nek outside Ladysmith. Although it ended in an almost-complete rout for the British forces, many Boer leaders (De Wet among them) felt that a grievous error had been made by allowing the British to withdraw at all. It was held by these mean that merely turning the British columns meant that the Boer forces could do little but besiege Ladysmith, which meant that continuing the push to the coast was impossible.

Reitz, present at the battle, describes this error thus:

"… I heard one of them exclaim, 'My God; look there!' and turning round we saw the entire British force that had come out against us on the plain that morning in full retreat to Ladysmith. Great clouds of dust billowed over the veld as the troops withdrew, and the manner of their going had every appearance of a rout. There were about 10 000 soldiers, but General Joubert had far more than that number of horsemen ready to his hand, and we fully looked to see him unleash them on the enemy. I heard Christian de Wet mutter, 'Los jou ruiters; los jou ruiters' ['Release your cavalry'] but the Commandant-General allowed this wonderful opportunity to go by, a failure that cost us dear in the days to come."

Later, Reitz describes how when his subordinates implored him to press his attack, Joubert had quoted an old proverb to them, saying "When God holds out a finger, don't take the whole hand". This cautious attitude, as Reitz points out, has no place in a war, especially a war in which speedy victory is vital to avoid complete defeat.

At the famous siege of Mafeking, too, a tiny and under-equipped garrison was able to tie up a sizeable proportion of the Boer forces, despite bring out-gunned, out-manned, and completely surrounded. Why did the Boers allow this vital moment of strategic advantage to pass?

It is important to examine the First Anglo-Boer War of 1881 for the answer to this question. At the heart of the speed with which the British agreed to signed was the degree to which the 'Boer Problem' seemed to be a thorny issue in which there was no incentive for the British to become involved. To the Boers, however, this must have seemed to indicate that the British tended to fold in the face of quick, decisive attacks by a determined enemy. It cannot be doubted that Boer attacks in the opening months of the war were bold and decisive; but one must wonder whether the Boer strategy of taking the ports was a real aim or just a rallying cry. It seems more likely that the Boers expected another quick British capitulation, followed by "peace on honourable terms". When this was not forthcoming, even after "Black Week" (11-15 December 1899), it is understandable that the Boer offensive began to stagnate. They had, in the final analysis, tried to bluff the British into backing down, but by slackening the pace of their advance, they had made the success of such a gambit impossible. In addition, the lack of incentive for British commitment had vanished as the riches of the Witwatersrand had blossomed; this alone, in retrospect, should have alerted the Boers to the fact that the British would not be as squeamish this time.

As time went by and the strength of the British presence in South Africa increased, and with it the number of heavy guns available to support infantry attacks, the Boer lines began to buckle and fall. In a mere six months the victories won so easily by the Boers in the initial phases of the war had all been lost; in early 1900, both Bloemfontein and Pretoria fell. At the battle of Donkershoek, shortly thereafter, the strong British artillery presence forced General De la Rey to withdraw from a position where the ill-fated British cavalry section had been surrounded and was slowly being annihilated.

The message was clear; Boer marksmanship and courage were no longer the main forces on the battlefield. By this stage, it is possible to say that the Anglo-Boer War was, in fact, over. This view would, of course, be strongly contested by the thousands of men who spent the next two years either engaged in guerilla warfare against the occupying British, or in mostly fruitless sweeps through the veld hunting the Boers, to say nothing of those unfortunates who were interned, and who died, in the British concentration camps. However, this is the inescapable conclusion that must be reached. The Boers would never field a force in a conventional battle of the scale that was common in the first year of the war; the Boer commandos had been split to the four winds with little in the way of heavy weapons or supplies, and this limited their effectiveness drastically. Reitz describes encountering several of these ragged groups of rebels during this phase; most seemed most concerned with simply evading capture, rather than striking any kind of blows against the British. Notable exceptions, of course, were present. Commandant De Wet had managed to keep a fighting force of several thousand men together and relatively active in the Free State, and Smut's abortive plans for the re-invasion of the Cape Colony and Natal had left him with around 3 000 partially assembled men in these areas. However, what could be accomplished with these forces? Acts of terrorism, train-wrecking and ambushes, but little else. It was eventually put to these bittereinders that, having lost the war, they should now surrender and attempt to "win the peace"; prolonged struggle, it seemed, was pointless. British occupation was now too firmly entrenched to be removed by force, even if force could be brought to bear in sufficient quantities - which it couldn't.

The war had finally been lost.